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 Recht op leven. Recht op eerbiediging privéle-
ven. Het niet nemen van (feitelijke) overheids-
maatregelen en verschaffen van informatie 
over de gevaren van asbestblootstelling levert 
schending op van  artikel 2 en  artikel 8 EVRM. 
 Klagers zijn vanaf 1950/1960 tot begin 2000 
werkzaam geweest bij scheepsreparatiewerf MDC 
(Malta Drydocks Corporation), die gedurende hun 
werknemerschap volledig in handen was van de 
Maltese overheid. Hun werkzaamheden beston-
den onder meer uit het verwijderen (scheuren) en 
terugplaatsen van asbestplaten in schepen, waar-
door zij voortdurend en intensief in contact zijn ge-
weest met (afgebroken) asbestdeeltjes. Weliswaar 
verschafte de staat, als werkgever, bij tijd en wijle 
stofmaskers, experts hadden in een eerdere Maltese 
rechtszaak vastgesteld dat dit masker van inferieure 
kwaliteit was en onvoldoende bescherming tegen 
asbestdeeltjes bood. Volgens klagers heeft de over-
heid gewaarschuwd voor de schadelijke gevolgen 
van asbest, de werkvoorzieningen aangepast, noch 
anderszins informatie verschaft over de mogelijke 
gevaren van het werken met asbest. Na de dood van 
een collega in 2006 — waarvan de nabestaanden 
eveneens voor het Hof opkomen — besloten klagers 
zich medisch te laten onderzoeken. Allen, op één na, 
vertonen ziektebeelden die in verband kunnen wor-
den gebracht met asbestblootstelling. 
 Omdat klagers naast materiële ook immateriële 
schade gecompenseerd willen zien en vergoeding 
van immateriële schade in het Maltese recht niet in 
een civiele procedure kan worden gevorderd, maak-
ten ze een constitutionele procedure aanhangig. 
Daar werden zij echter niet-ontvankelijk verklaard 
op grond van de redenering dat zij eerst een actie uit 
onrechtmatige daad aanhangig dienden te maken 
bij de civiele rechter. Klagers wenden zich vervol-
gens tot het Hof en beroepen zich, voor zover hier 
van belang, op een schending van  artikel 2 en  artikel 
8 EVRM nu de staat zou hebben nagelaten hen te 
beschermen tegen ernstige gezondheidsrisico’s. 
 De regering van Malta beroept zich voor het Hof 
op  artikel 35 EVRM omdat de nationale rechtsmid-
delen niet uitgeput zouden zijn. Klagers hadden zich 
tot de civiele rechter moeten wenden, want hoewel 
het nationale recht geen vergoeding van immateriële 
schade toestaat, kunnen rechters, volgens de rege-
ring, in de praktijk wel degelijk partijen tot vergoe-
ding van immateriële schade veroordelen. Voor het 
Hof weet de regering echter geen relevante voor-
beelden te noemen. Om die reden meent het Hof dat 
de nationale civiele procedure niet gezien kan wor-
den als een voldoende adequaat rechtsmiddel. Op 
de suggestie van de regering dat klagers eerst mate-
riële schadevergoeding hadden kunnen vorderen bij 
de civiele rechter en voor het overige een constituti-
onele procedure aanhangig hadden kunnen maken 
voor de resterende, immateriële schade, oordeelt het 
Hof dat het nationale recht een dergelijke volgorde 
niet voorschrijft. In het licht daarvan en met het oog 
op de omstandigheden van het betreffende geval is 
het Hof van mening dat het klagers niet kan worden 
tegengeworpen dat zij slechts één procedure zijn 
gestart in plaats van twee. Door aldus te handelen 
hebben klagers bovendien het belang van de proces-
economie bevorderd. De nationale beroepsinstan-
ties hadden volgens het Hof naar nationaal recht 
de mogelijkheid om bescherming te bieden tegen de 
verdragsschendingen door de staat, maar hebben 
nagelaten dat te effectueren. Het ontvankelijkheids-
verweer van de staat gebaseerd op artikel 35 EVRM 
treft daarmee geen doel. 
 Met betrekking tot het beroep op  artikel 2 EVRM 
stelt het Hof voorop dat het artikel in beginsel van 
toepassing is op situaties als deze, waarin werkne-
mers worden blootgesteld aan asbest bij een onder-
neming in staatseigendom. De staat heeft op grond 
van dat artikel de positieve verplichting noodzake-
lijke maatregelen te nemen om de levens van hen 
die het betreft te beschermen. Gelet op het feit dat 
een collega in 2006 is overleden aan ziektever-
schijnselen die in verband kunnen worden gebracht 
met asbestblootstelling is artikel 2 EVRM op het be-
roep van de nabestaanden van toepassing. De ove-
rige klagers vertonen weliswaar asbestgerelateerde 
ziektebeelden, maar hun situatie is niet van levens-
bedreigende aard zodanig dat artikel 2 EVRM ook 
op hen van toepassing is. Echter, de strekking van de 
positieve verplichtingen voortvloeiende uit artikel 2 
EVRM is, op het terrein van gevaarlijke activiteiten, 
grotendeels gelijk aan die uit  artikel 8 EVRM. Daar-
om acht het Hof de toepassing van artikel 8 EVRM 
op de overige klagers gepast. 
 Op de vraag of de staat heeft voldaan aan zijn 
uit  artikel 2 en  artikel 8 EVRM voortvloeiende po-
sitieve verplichtingen onderzoekt het Hof eerst of 
de staat ten tijde van de asbestblootstelling tus-
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sen 1950/1960 en 2000 op de hoogte was, of op 
de hoogte had kunnen zijn van de risico’s van as-
bestblootstelling. Dit blijkt het geval. Tot aan 2003 
bleef wetgeving ter voorkoming van het gevaar 
aan blootstelling echter uit. Het Hof overweegt dat, 
hoewel er een plicht voor de staat bestaat om met 
wetgevende en administratieve maatregelen op te 
treden, ook bij afwezigheid van dergelijke maatre-
gelen, in specifieke omstandigheden, de positieve 
verplichting op de staat rust om feitelijke maatrege-
len te nemen om werknemers te beschermen tegen 
de gezondheidsrisico’s. Het Hof constateert in casu 
dat de staat niets heeft gedaan en evenmin informa-
tie heeft verschaft over de gevaren van asbest. Gelet 
op de ernst van het gevaar en ondanks de ‘margin of 
appreciation’ van de staat om de middelen te kiezen 
die hij geschikt acht, neemt het Hof schending van 
artikel 2 en artikel 8 EVRM aan. 
 Brincat e.a., 
 tegen 
 Malta. 
 The Law 
 I. Joinder of the applications 
 43.  In accordance with Rule 42 § 1 of the 
Rules of Court, the Court decides to join the ap-
plications, given their similar factual and legal 
background. 
 II. The government's objection of non-exhaus-
tion of domestic remedies 
 A. The parties' submissions 
 1. The Government 
 44.  The Government submitted that the ap-
plicants had not exhausted domestic remedies in 
respect of the substantive complaints under Arti-
cles 2, 3 and 8 of the Convention, concerning the 
Government's failure to protect the applicants 
rights' under those provisions. They had failed to 
institute an ordinary civil action, opting instead to 
attempt constitutional redress proceedings at the 
conclusion of which their claims had been dis-
missed for non-exhaustion of ordinary remedies. 
The Government noted that in their application 
the applicants had themselves cited the Pellicano 
case — which had been successful at the ordinary 
level — and the compensation award granted in 
that case by the Commercial Court. 
 45.  The Government further relied on  Ayte-
kin v. Turkey (23 September 1998, § 84,  Reports 
of Judgments and Decisions 1998-VII) in which, 
having taken into account the combination of the 
criminal, civil and administrative law remedies 
available, and in particular the prospects offered 
by the criminal proceedings for obtaining redress 
in respect of the death of the applicant's husband, 
the Court had not exempted the applicant in that 
case from the requirement to exhaust such reme-
dies. The Government also made reference to the 
case of  John Sammut and Visa Investments Limited 
v. Malta ((dec.), no. 27023/03, 28 June 2005), in 
which the Court had held that an action in tort 
could have resulted in an award of civil damages 
and that the aggregate of remedies could have re-
dressed the applicants' second grievance. 
 46.  Referring to Articles 1030-1033 of the 
Civil Code concerning an action in tort, the Go-
vernment submitted that, like any other per-
son, they could, through their representatives, 
be held liable for damages. Indeed the State had 
on numerous occasions been held liable for the 
payment of damages by the domestic courts (va-
rious examples were submitted to the Court). The 
Government referred in particular to the case of 
 Carmena Fenech et vs Chairmen of the Malta Dry-
docks noe et (Court of Appeal, 3 December 2010), 
which concerned asbestos exposure and where 
the Government had been ordered to pay ap-
proximately € 103,000 in damages. 
 47.  The Government conceded that — like 
any employer — they were obliged to provide a 
safe working environment and noted that they 
had been sued at various times for allegedly fai-
ling to provide such an environment. They cited 
 Francis Busuttil vs Sammy Meilaq nomine (First 
Hall, Civil Court, 9 December 2002) and  Gatt vs 
Chairman Malta Drydocks (sic.) (First Hall, Civil 
Court, 9 December 2002), in which the courts had 
found Malta Drydocks liable for damages because 
it had failed to provide a safe working environ-
ment and had been negligent in the maintenance 
of tools, thereby causing an accident that had 
resulted in the claimants' permanent disability. 
Similarly, in a comparable case, the State-owned 
airline, Air Malta, had been held liable for da-
mages. Indeed, domestic courts had found the 
Government liable for damages when the gover-
nmental act complained of constituted a breach 
of duty which was classified either as a negligent 
act or as a failure to carry out duties properly. Mo-
reover, in  Godfrey Buhagiar vs Malta Shipbuilding 
Company Limited (11 October 2011) the domestic 
courts had held that the fact that an employee 
consented to work in a dangerous environment 
did not mean that the employee accepted res-
ponsibility for any harm which he might suffer, 
with the result that the employer could therefore 
not raise the plea that the employee accepted 
such working conditions. 
 48.  As to the applicants' claim that compen-
sation for non-pecuniary damage could not be 
awarded in an ordinary action, referring to  Zavo-
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loka v. Latvia (cited above) the Government noted 
that in that case the Court had found that there 
was no absolute obligation to award such dama-
ges in circumstances such as those in that case. 
Moreover, while it was true that the law did not 
provide for compensation for non-pecuniary da-
mage, known as ‘moral damage’ in the domestic 
context (except for a few specific circumstances), 
and that such damages were not awarded in ac-
tions for tort, the way compensation was calcu-
lated allowed for the inclusion of non-pecuniary 
damage, although this was not mentioned. One 
such example was awarding loss of future ea-
rnings, based on a loss of opportunities, which 
in the Government's view was a veiled type of 
‘moral damage’, that is to say, non-pecuniary da-
mage as understood in the Convention case-law. 
Moreover, the Government considered that civil 
law did not prohibit such damage and cited two 
examples ( Dr J Pace noe vs The Prime Minister , Ci-
vil Court (First Hall), 1 June 2012, and  Mario Ge-
rada vs The Prime Minister , Civil Court (First Hall), 
14 November 2012) in which the applicants had 
been awarded compensation for ‘moral damage’ 
in cases involving breach of contract and unfair 
dismissal respectively. 
 2. The applicants 
 49.  The applicants contended that an ordi-
nary civil action against the Government as em-
ployer for material damage would not have been 
capable of addressing the multiple issues arising 
from the breaches of Articles 2, 3 and 8. Accepting 
that the Government could, like private individu-
als, be found liable in a tort action, the applicants 
submitted that an ordinary action of that nature 
could not have established the State's responsibi-
lity in line with Convention standards reflected in 
the Constitution. It followed that their complaints 
could therefore only be raised before the courts 
with constitutional jurisdiction as established by 
Article 46 of the Constitution (see ‘Relevant do-
mestic law’ above). 
 50.  Moreover, they noted that according to 
domestic case-law, in instances where the merits 
of a case were complex and had aspects which 
fell under both ordinary and constitutional law, 
the constitutional action was to prevail ( Anthony 
Mifsud vs Superintendent Carmelo Bonello et , Con-
stitutional Court, 18 September 2009). 
 51.  The applicants noted that they were see-
king damages arising from death and grievous 
bodily harm which were not the result of normal 
torts such as a traffic accidents but which were 
a result of the Government's failure to fulfil their 
positive obligations under the Convention, na-
mely to safeguard a person's life, to investigate 
properly any death or harm for which the State 
was responsible, to provide information about 
any risk to life or health, and to identify the per-
sons responsible for the violation. It followed that 
they were also entitled to compensation for non-
pecuniary damage. 
 52.  An ordinary civil action in tort could only 
provide for compensation for pecuniary damage, 
namely  damnum emergens and  lucrum cessans , 
the expressly limited heads of damage provided 
for by Maltese law. In fact, compensation for non-
pecuniary damage was not provided for in law, as 
shown by decades of case-law where judges had 
repeatedly held that no compensation for non-
pecuniary damage could be awarded. Moreover, 
proposals had recently been made in Parliament 
to make provision for compensation for non-
pecuniary damage in certain cases — proposals 
which would be pointless if the Government's 
contention that such damage were not preclu-
ded were true. Moreover, an occasional lapse 
by a good-hearted judge extending the scope of 
pecuniary damage could hardly be considered 
the right way of dealing with human rights vio-
lations. In the applicants' view the only available 
remedy was constitutional redress proceedings, 
which they had unsuccessfully instituted. 
 53.  Furthermore, the ineffectiveness of such 
an ordinary remedy was evident in so far as the 
law (Article 1032 of the Civil Code) provided that 
no one was to be found liable in the absence of 
any express legal provision. Indeed, ordinary law 
did not provide for actions dealing with activities 
that breached Article 8 of the Convention — a 
provision which the applicants had also relied on 
and which, moreover, did not correspond to any 
constitutionally protected right in Malta. 
 54.  The applicants argued that the Consti-
tutional Court had dismissed their claims on the 
grounds of failure to use a remedy that was inef-
fective. It had, moreover, found that only if the ap-
plicants still felt that the breaches of their rights 
had not been redressed by that remedy could 
they opt for constitutional redress proceedings. 
The applicants contended that, although part of 
their claim could have been addressed by the 
ordinary courts, the courts with constitutional 
jurisdiction were not precluded from addres-
sing the case to its full extent. They submitted 
that in  Carmena Fenech vs Chairman of the Malta 
Drydocks , (cited above) one of the cases relied on 
by the Government, the claimant (who was the 
widow of a dry-docks employee who had suc-
cumbed to malignant mesothelioma) had been 
awarded out-of-pocket damages and compensa-
tion for loss of future earnings in respect of her 
husband. Thus, if she had wished to claim any 
compensation for non-pecuniary damage, she 
would still have had to lodge another claim with 
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viding redress in respect of the applicants' com-
plaints, and offered reasonable prospects of suc-
cess. However, once this burden of proof has been 
satisfied, it falls to the applicant to establish that 
the remedy advanced by the Government had in 
fact been used or was for some reason inadequate 
and ineffective in the particular circumstances of 
the case or that there existed special circumstan-
ces absolving him or her from the requirement 
(see  Ananyev and Others v. Russia , nos. 42525/07 
and 60800/08, § 94, 10 January 2012). 
 58.  The Court emphasises that the applica-
tion of the rule must, however, make due allo-
wance for the fact that it is being applied in the 
context of machinery for the protection of human 
rights that the Contracting Parties have agreed 
to set up. Accordingly, it has recognised that the 
rule on exhaustion of domestic remedies must be 
applied with some degree of flexibility and wit-
hout excessive formalism (see  Cardot v. France , 19 
March 1991, § 34, Series A no. 200). It has further 
recognised that the rule on exhaustion is neither 
absolute nor capable of being applied automati-
cally; in reviewing whether it has been observed, 
it is essential to have regard to the particular cir-
cumstances of each individual case (see  Van Oos-
terwijck v. Belgium , 6 November 1980, § 35, Series 
A no. 40). This means — amongst other things — 
that it must take realistic account not only of the 
existence of formal remedies in the legal system 
of the Contracting Party concerned but also of the 
general legal and political context in which they 
operate as well as the personal circumstances of 
the applicants (see  Akdivar and Others v. Turkey , 
16 September 1996, §§ 65-68,  Reports 1996-IV). 
 59.  According to the Court's case-law, in the 
event of a breach of Articles 2 and 3, which rank 
as the most fundamental provisions of the Con-
vention, compensation for the non-pecuniary 
damage flowing from the breach should in prin-
ciple be available as part of the range of possible 
remedies (see  Z and Others v. the United Kingdom 
[GC], no. 29392/95, § 109, ECHR 2001-V;  Keenan 
v. the United Kingdom , no. 27229/95, § 130, ECHR 
2001-III;  Paul and Audrey Edwards v. the United 
Kingdom , no. 46477/99, §§ 97-98, ECHR 2002-II 
and  Ciorap v. Moldova (no. 2), no. 7481/06, §§ 24-
25, 20 July 2010). The principle applies also where 
the violation arises from the alleged failure by the 
authorities to protect persons from the acts of 
others (see  Z and Others , cited above, § 109; and 
 Kontrová v. Slovakia , no. 7510/04, §§ 63-65, 31 
May 2007). 
 60.  In appropriate cases, also when the vi-
olation relates solely to Article 8, the Court may 
still consider under Article 13 that, compensation 
for the pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage 
flowing from the breach should in principle be 
the courts with constitutional jurisdiction. It fol-
lowed that the applicants had rightly brought 
their claim before the only court that could have 
found that there had been a breach of their hu-
man rights and awarded the compensation for 
non-pecuniary damage sought. 
 B. The Court's assessment 
 1. General principles 
 55.  The Court reiterates that the rule on ex-
haustion of domestic remedies referred to in Arti-
cle 35 of the Convention obliges those seeking to 
bring their case against the State before the Court 
to use first the remedies provided by the national 
legal system. Consequently, States are dispensed 
from answering for their acts before an internati-
onal body until they have had an opportunity to 
put matters right through their own legal system. 
The rule is based on the assumption — reflected 
in Article 13 of the Convention, with which it has 
close affinity — that there is an effective remedy 
available to deal with the substance of an ‘argua-
ble complaint’ under the Convention and to grant 
appropriate relief. It thus represents an important 
aspect of the principle that the machinery of pro-
tection established by the Convention is subsidi-
ary to the national systems safeguarding human 
rights (see  Kudła v. Poland [GC], no. 30210/96, 
§ 152, ECHR 2000-XI, and  Handyside v the United 
Kingdom , 7 December 1976, § 48, Series A no. 24). 
 56.  The only remedies which Article 35 § 1 
requires to be exhausted are those which relate 
to the alleged breach and which are available 
and sufficient (see  McFarlane v. Ireland [GC], no. 
31333/06, § 107, 10 September 2010), that is to 
say a remedy that offers the chance of redressing 
the alleged breach and is not a pure repetition of 
a remedy already exhausted (see  Dreiblats v. Lat-
via (dec.), no. 8283/07, 4 June 2013). There is no 
requirement to use another remedy which has 
essentially the same objective (see  T.W. v. Malta 
[GC], no. 25644/94, § 34, 29 April 1999). Howe-
ver, noting the strong affinity between Article 
35 § 1 and Article 13, the Court has ruled that if 
a single remedy does not by itself entirely satisfy 
the requirements of Article 13, the aggregate of 
remedies provided for under domestic law may 
do so (see  Čonka v. Belgium , no. 51564/99, § 75, 
ECHR 2002-I;  Kudła , cited above, § 157;  T.P. and 
K.M. v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 28945/95, 
§ 107, ECHR 2001-V; and  Rotaru v. Romania [GC], 
no. 28341/95 § 69, ECHR 2000-V). 
 57.  It is incumbent on the Government clai-
ming non-exhaustion to satisfy the Court that the 
remedy was an effective one available both in 
theory and in practice at the relevant time, that is 
to say, that it was accessible, was capable of pro-
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for damages in tort cannot be considered to be 
a sufficiently certain remedy for the purposes 
of providing any non-pecuniary damage which 
may be due for such breaches (see,  mutatis mu-
tandis, Aden Ahmed v. Malta , no. 55352/12, § 59, 
23 July 2013). The Court further notes that loss of 
opportunity, to which the Government referred, 
is a type of pecuniary, and not non-pecuniary, 
damage. Lastly, it does not appear that the ordi-
nary court in such an action would have had the 
competence or authority to give any other form of 
redress relevant to their complaints. 
 64.  In so far as the Government pleaded that 
there existed an aggregate of remedies which 
the applicants did not exhaust, it is true that the 
Court has sometimes found under certain condi-
tions that an aggregate of remedies sufficed for 
the purposes of Article 13 in conjunction with 
Articles 2 and 3 (see, for example,  Giuliani and 
Gaggio v. Italy [GC], no. 23458/02, § 338, ECHR 
2011 (extracts)). This concept generally refers to 
a number of remedies which can be taken up one 
after the other or in parallel and which cater for 
different aspects of redress, such as a civil remedy 
providing for compensation and a criminal action 
for the purposes of satisfying the procedural as-
pect of Articles 2 and 3 (ibid., § 337). The Court 
has also encountered the notion or system of ap-
plying for different heads of damages through 
different procedures and found no particular 
problem with such a system (see  Dreiblats , cited 
above), both being available options. 
 65.  Turning to the present case, the Court 
acknowledges that an action in tort could appro-
priately address the issue of pecuniary damage 
(see paragraphs 22 and 63 above). The Court also 
considers that the remedy provided by the courts 
exercising constitutional jurisdiction provides a 
forum guaranteeing due process of law and effec-
tive participation for the aggrieved individual. In 
such proceedings, courts exercising constitutio-
nal jurisdiction can take cognisance of the merits 
of the complaint, make findings of fact and order 
redress that is tailored to the nature and gravity 
of the violation. These courts can also make an 
award of compensation for non-pecuniary dama-
ge and there is no limit as to the amount which 
can be awarded to an applicant for such a viola-
tion (see,  mutatis mutandis, Gera de Petri Testafer-
rata Bonici Ghaxaq v. Malta , no. 26771/07, § 69, 5 
April 2011, in relation to Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, 
and  Zarb v. Malta , no. 16631/04, § 51, 4 July 2006, 
in relation to Article 6). The ensuing judicial deci-
sion will be binding on the defaulting authority 
and enforceable against it. The Court is therefore 
satisfied that the existing legal framework ren-
ders the constitutional remedy capable, in theory 
at least, of affording,  inter alia , appropriate com-
available as part of the range of redress (see  T.P. 
and K.M. v. the United Kingdom [GC], cited above, 
§ 107). 
 2. Application to the present case 
 61.  The Government appear to raise this ob-
jection on the basis of three arguments: firstly 
that the Convention did not provide for a right 
to compensation for non-pecuniary damage and 
that therefore an ordinary action in tort would 
have sufficed, but the applicants failed to pursue 
it; secondly, even assuming that there was a right 
to compensation for non-pecuniary damage, the 
applicants could still have had a chance of obtai-
ning it — subject to the good will of the judge — in 
ordinary tort proceedings, which the applicants 
did not institute; and thirdly, they appear to in-
voke the effectiveness of an aggregate of reme-
dies, which the Court understands as comprising 
an ordinary action in tort which could have awar-
ded compensation for pecuniary damage plus a 
subsequent constitutional redress action which 
could have awarded compensation for non-pecu-
niary damage. 
 62.  As transpires from the general principles 
and the case-law of the Court already cited, in the 
circumstances of the present case concerning, 
 inter alia , complaints under Articles 2 and 3, com-
pensation for the pecuniary and non-pecuniary 
damage flowing from the breach should in prin-
ciple be available as part of the range of redress 
accessible to the applicants. The same must be 
held in respect of the complaint under Article 8 
which in this specific case is closely connected to 
the said provisions. 
 63.  As to the ordinary civil proceedings in the 
form of an action in tort, the Court has no doubts 
about the possibility of bringing such an action 
against the Government and about the prospects 
of success of such an action as also transpires from 
the case-law submitted. Nevertheless, the Court 
notes that an action in tort which is perfectly ca-
pable of awarding material/pecuniary damage 
does not in general provide for an award of non-
pecuniary damage (‘moral damage’ as under-
stood in the Maltese context). While it is true that 
the Government submitted two recent examples 
of such damages being awarded, they were una-
ble to identify a legal provision for awards of 
such non-pecuniary damage. Moreover, against a 
background of decades during which the domes-
tic courts have consistently interpreted Article 
1045 of the Civil Code (see paragraph 22 above) 
as excluding non-pecuniary damage, and in the 
light of the fact that one of these two judgments 
(delivered by the same judge) has been appealed 
against by the Government and is still pending 
before the Court of Appeal, an ordinary civil claim 
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physical difficulties and were prone to malignant 
mesothelioma (as occurred in the case of the 
deceased Mr Attard) and they were challenging 
the Government for having failed to protect them 
against such negative consequences. Mr Dyer alt-
hough not affected to date was at risk of suffering 
the same fate. For the purpose of seeking redress, 
they were confronted with the two possibilities 
available under the Maltese legal order, namely 
(i) instituting an ordinary civil action which could 
only partly redress their grievances (and which 
could have taken years to decide — in the  Pelli-
cano case the action was commenced in 1980 and 
was only finally determined ten years later) follo-
wed by constitutional redress proceedings which 
could redress the remaining unsatisfied claims or 
(ii) instituting constitutional redress proceedings 
which could deal with the entirety of their re-
quests for redress. It has not been submitted that 
their applications before the courts with consti-
tutional jurisdiction had no prospects of success; 
these courts could have chosen to exercise other-
wise their discretion and take cognisance of the 
case, instead of declining to do so. Indeed, the lat-
ter course of action would appear to have been 
the most appropriate approach even from the 
perspective of domestic case-law (see paragraphs 
25-26 and 47 above) and probably the only ap-
proach possible in the case of Mr Dyer. 
 69.  Consequently, in the circumstances of 
the present case and particularly in the absence 
of any pre-existing mandatory legal require-
ments ensuing from law or well-established case-
law requiring the institution of civil tort actions 
before recourse to the constitutional organs (in 
circumstances such as those of the present case), 
the Court considers that the applicants cannot be 
held to blame for pursuing one remedy instead 
of two. Moreover, such an action would have also 
served the interests of economy of proceedings 
given that — in any event — the applicants would 
have been bound to go before the constitutional 
organs to obtain the full range of redress which 
they claimed. 
 70.  The Court also notes that in their ap-
plications before the constitutional jurisdictions 
the applicants concerned requested the court to 
quantify a fair amount of compensation for the 
breach of their rights, to liquidate such amount 
and to order that this pecuniary redress be paid 
individually to each applicant (see paragraph 
14 above). The Court considers that this general 
wording used by the applicants does not specifi-
cally exclude, as the Constitutional Court seems 
to have held (see paragraph 17, in fine, above) 
non-pecuniary damage as understood in the 
Court's case-law. On the contrary it must be ta-
ken as including both pecuniary (‘material’ da-
pensatory redress concerning both pecuniary and 
non-pecuniary damage. 
 66.  The domestic system thus offers one 
legal avenue which would have provided solely 
for pecuniary damage and another one which 
allowed for a finding of a violation, provided for 
all heads of damage, and, moreover, could have 
afforded any other means of redress relevant 
to the complaints at issue. The Court observes 
that it does not transpire that in such cases na-
tional law necessarily requires that ordinary ci-
vil proceedings be undertaken as a  sine qua non 
before the institution of constitutional redress 
proceedings, and neither has this been claimed 
by the Government. The same was in fact held 
recently by the Civil Court (First Hall) in its con-
stitutional jurisdiction (see paragraph 26,  in fine , 
above). The Constitutional Court's decision, and, 
before that, the similar decision of the Civil Court 
(First Hall) in its constitutional jurisdiction, decli-
ning the exercise of its jurisdiction was therefore 
not mandatory under procedural rules, or in ac-
cordance with any well-established case-law to 
that effect, but rather was a matter of discretion, 
that is to say it was based on the judgment of the 
judges sitting on that bench, as provided for in the 
Constitution (see relevant domestic law). It fol-
lows that there is nothing legally incorrect about 
the rulings of the constitutional organs, and the 
use of an ordinary remedy before the constituti-
onal redress proceedings is not only customary 
but also desirable in order to avoid burdening the 
constitutional jurisdictions unnecessarily with 
cases. It may be that such an aim would be better 
achieved if the ordinary courts had the power to 
award also non-pecuniary (‘moral’) damage. Ho-
wever, even though in the Maltese legal system 
the ordinary remedy was limited in scope, it can-
not be considered ineffective if followed by con-
stitutional redress proceedings, and therefore the 
existence of an effective aggregate of remedies 
cannot be denied. 
 67.  Nevertheless, in the present case the 
Court notes that the Constitutional Court's deci-
sion seems to have been based on a very broad 
reading of the Court's case-law. The Court notes 
that, in  Zavoloka it held, solely, that there was no 
right to non-pecuniary damage in circumstances 
such as those of that specific case, where the ap-
plicant's daughter had died as a result of a traffic 
accident due to the negligence of a third party 
and where no responsibility, whether direct or 
indirect, could be attributed to the authorities. 
 68.  Furthermore, in connection with the spe-
cific circumstances of the present case, the Court 
notes that the applicants (apart from the family 
of Mr Attard and Mr Dyer) were found to have 
pleural plaques in their lungs, were experiencing 
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protection of health or morals, or for the pro-
tection of the rights and freedoms of others.” 
 74.  The Government contested that argu-
ment. 
 A. The substantive complaints 
 1. Admissibility 
 (a)  The parties' submissions as to the applica-
bility of the provisions 
 75.  The Government submitted that the me-
dical certificates produced by the applicants did 
not establish a direct link between their medical 
complaints and the fact that they were employed 
in the shipbuilding or ship repair industry. The 
medical certificate in the case of Mr Attard stated 
that his death was  ‘likely to be a result of asbes-
tos exposure’ . The same comment appeared on 
the other certificates. The Government further 
submitted that although chest X-rays were the 
most common tool for detecting asbestos-related 
diseases, they could not detect asbestos fibres in 
the lungs. 
 76.  The Government contended that everyo-
ne was exposed to asbestos at some time during 
their life as low levels of asbestos are present in 
the air, water and soil. Relying on a factsheet of 
5 January 2009 issued by the National Cancer 
Institute entitled  ‘Asbestos Exposure and Cancer 
Risk’ , the Government noted that the risks of de-
veloping an asbestos-related disease depended 
on various factors, including how much asbestos 
one was exposed to, the length of the exposure, 
the size, shape and chemical composition of the 
asbestos fibres, the source of the exposure, and 
individual risk factors such as smoking and pre-
existing lung disease. Indeed the combination of 
smoking and asbestos exposure was particularly 
hazardous. However, exposure did not necessa-
rily lead subsequently to lung disease. 
 77.  They explained that if products contai-
ning asbestos were disturbed, tiny asbestos fibres 
were released into the air. When these were bre-
athed in, they became trapped in the lungs and 
over time could accumulate and cause scarring 
and inflammation, which could affect breathing. 
It was rare for a cancer of the thin membranes 
that lined the chest and abdomen to develop 
from asbestos exposure and the more likely con-
sequence was an increased risk of asbestosis, an 
inflammatory condition affecting the lungs and 
causing shortness of breath, coughing and lung 
damage, and other non-malignant lung and pleu-
ral disorders including pleural plaques (changes 
in the membrane surrounding the lung), pleural 
thickening and benign pleural effusions (abnor-
mal collections of fluid between the thin layers of 
mage, consisting under domestic law of  damnum 
emergens and  lucrum cessans ) and non-pecuniary 
(‘moral’) damage, the term ‘pecuniary’ used by 
the applicants meaning simply ‘monetary’ and 
therefore before the domestic courts the relevant 
applicants' request cannot be said to have been 
deficient. 
 71.  In the specific circumstances of the case, 
the Court is therefore satisfied that the national 
judicial authorities were provided with the op-
portunity to remedy the alleged violations of 
the Convention but failed to do so. Consequently, 
from the Court's perspective, the applicants' in-
stitution of constitutional proceedings sufficed in 
the present case for the purpose of exhaustion of 
domestic remedies in respect of the substantive 
complaints under Articles 2, 3 and 8. 
 72.  The Government's objection is therefore 
dismissed. 
 III. Alleged violation of articles 2 and 8 of the 
convention 
 73.  The applicants complained under Arti-
cles 2 and 8 of the Convention in respect of their 
exposure to asbestos (or that of their deceased 
relative in the case of application no. 62338/11) 
and of the Government's failings in that respect. 
The relevant provisions read: 
 Article 2 
 “1.  Everyone's right to life shall be pro-
tected by law. No one shall be deprived of his 
life intentionally save in the execution of a 
sentence of a court following his conviction of 
a crime for which this penalty is provided by 
law. 
 2.  Deprivation of life shall not be regar-
ded as inflicted in contravention of this Article 
when it results from the use of force which is 
no more than absolutely necessary: 
 (a)  in defence of any person from unlaw-
ful violence; 
 (b)  in order to effect a lawful arrest or to 
prevent the escape of a person lawfully de-
tained; 
 (c)  in action lawfully taken for the pur-
pose of quelling a riot or insurrection.’ 
 Article 8 
 “1.  Everyone has the right to respect for 
his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence. 
 2.  There shall be no interference by a 
public authority with the exercise of this right 
except such as is in accordance with the law 
and is necessary in a democratic society in the 
interests of national security, public safety or 
the economic well-being of the country, for 
the prevention of disorder or crime, for the 
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21166/02, 20058/02, 11673/02 and 15343/02, 
§ 146, ECHR 2008 (extracts)). More particularly, 
the Court has repeatedly examined complaints 
under Article 2 from persons suffering from se-
rious illnesses. Such cases include  G.N. and Others 
v. Italy (no. 43134/05, 1 December 2009) in which 
the applicants suffered from the potentially life-
threatening disease hepatitis C;  L.C.B. v. the Uni-
ted Kingdom (cited above), where the applicant 
suffered from leukaemia diminishing her chan-
ces of survival,  Hristozov and Others v. Bulgaria , 
nos. 47039/11 and 358/12, ECHR 2012 (extracts), 
concerning applicants suffering from different 
types of terminal cancer;  Karchen and Others v. 
France ((dec.), no. 5722/04, 4 March 2008) and 
 Oyal v. Turkey (no. 4864/05, 23 March 2010), in 
which the applicants had been infected with the 
HIV virus, which endangered their life;  Nitecki v. 
Poland ((dec.), no. 65653/01, 21 March 2002), in 
which the applicant suffered from amyotrophic 
lateral sclerosis;  Gheorghe v. Romania ((dec.), no. 
19215/04, 22 September 2005), in which the ap-
plicant suffered from haemophilia; and  De Santis 
and Olanda v. Italy ((dec.), 35887/11, 9 July 2013) 
in which the applicant — who was severely disa-
bled — suffered a cerebral haemorrhage as a con-
sequence of an infection acquired in hospital. 
 83.  The medical certification indicated that 
Mr Attard's death was likely to be a result of as-
bestos exposure; malignant mesothelioma is 
known to be a rare cancer associated with asbes-
tos exposure. The Court observes that it has not 
been contested or denied that Mr Attard worked 
at Malta Drydocks for more than a decade (1959-
1974), during which time he was repeatedly 
exposed to asbestos. Neither has it been shown 
that Mr Attard could have been contaminated 
elsewhere or that he was affected by other fac-
tors that could have led to the disease. In these 
circumstances, and given that Mr Attard has died 
as a result of his cancer, the Court considers that 
Article 2 is applicable to the complaint brought 
by the applicants in application no. 62338/11 re-
lating to the death of the said Mr Attard. 
 84.  As to the remaining applicants who also 
worked at MDC, the documentation presented in-
dicates that all but one applicant (Mr Dyer) have 
respiratory problems and plaques in their lungs, 
together with some other complications related 
to exposure to asbestos, but have not to date been 
diagnosed with malignant mesothelioma. It can 
neither be said that their conditions constitute 
an inevitable precursor to the diagnosis of that 
disease, nor that their current conditions are of 
a life-threatening nature. It follows that Article 
2 does not apply in their case and the complaint 
brought by the remaining applicants under the 
Article under examination is incompatible  ratio-
tissue lining the lungs and the wall of the chest 
cavity). According to the Government, it was well 
known in the medical community that pleural 
plaques were not precursors to lung cancer. 
 78.  The applicants considered that through 
negligence, recklessness and lack of commitment 
on the part of the authorities they were robbed of 
their life expectancy through an irrevocable pro-
cess of pain and lethal illness. The Government's 
responsibility was even more evident conside-
ring that those actions and/or omissions had 
taken place at MDC, a Government-controlled 
entity — that is to say, at the applicants' place of 
work. 
 (b)  The Court's assessment 
 79.  The Court reiterates that Article 2 does 
not solely concern deaths resulting from the use 
of unjustified force by agents of the State but 
also, in the first sentence of its first paragraph, 
lays down a positive obligation on States to take 
appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those 
within their jurisdiction (see, for example,  L.C.B. 
v. the United Kingdom , 9 June 1998, § 36, Reports 
1998-III, and  Paul and Audrey Edwards , cited abo-
ve, § 54). 
 80.  This obligation is construed as applying 
in the context of any activity, whether public or 
not, in which the right to life may be at stake, and 
 a fortiori in the case of industrial activities which 
by their very nature are dangerous, such as the 
operation of waste-collection sites (see  Öneryıldız 
v. Turkey [GC], no. 48939/99, §71, ECHR 2004-XII) 
or nuclear testing (see  L.C.B. cited above, § 36) or 
cases concerning toxic emissions from a fertiliser 
factory (see  Guerra and Others v. Italy , 19 February 
1998, §§ 60 and 62,  Reports 1998-I, although in 
this case the Court found that it was not necessa-
ry to examine the issue under Article 2, it having 
been examined under Article 8). 
 81.  The Court considers that the same obli-
gations may apply in cases, such as the present 
one, dealing with exposure to asbestos at a work-
place which was run by a public corporation ow-
ned and controlled by the Government. 
 82.  The Court reiterates that it has applied 
Article 2 both where an individual has died (see, 
for example,  Öneryıldız , cited above) and where 
there was a serious risk of an ensuing death, 
even if the applicant was alive at the time of the 
application. Examples include cases where the 
physical integrity of an applicant was threatened 
by the action of a third party (see  Osman v. the 
United Kingdom , 28 October 1998, §§ 115-122, 
 Reports 1998-VIII) or as a result of a natural ca-
tastrophe which left no doubt as to the existence 
of a threat to the applicants' physical integrity 
(see  Budayeva and Others v. Russia , nos. 15339/02, 
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 2. Merits 
 (a)  The parties' submissions 
 (i)  The applicants 
 91.  The applicants complained that the Go-
vernment had failed to fulfil their positive obliga-
tions under the relevant Convention provisions. 
 92.  The applicants submitted that the causal 
link between asbestos and respiratory disease 
had been documented as early as 1938 and that 
the causal link between mesothelioma and asbes-
tos exposure had been conclusively established 
in the early 1960s. Information on the dangers 
of asbestos had been available since the 1950s 
and — given that it was members of the ILO who 
had raised awareness of the issue — the autho-
rities should have known of the risks it posed to 
the health of employees, even more so following 
1979 when the Government had been one of the 
parties to a lawsuit involving the subject matter 
(see paragraph 10 above). Nevertheless, the MDC 
employees had been neither informed about nor 
protected from the dangers of asbestos in any 
way and they had been assured that adequate 
ventilation and the wearing of cloth masks would 
protect them from it. The applicants claimed that 
these masks, made of flimsy disposable material, 
had provided insufficient protection, them being 
totally inadequate for use at their place of work 
or for the purposes of protection from asbestos. 
According to the applicants, the ‘adequate venti-
lation’ could not be considered to have been suf-
ficient either, as was clearly apparent from their 
medical tests, which had shown that they were 
suffering from asbestos-related diseases. 
 93.  The applicants pointed out that the Go-
vernment had admitted that nothing had been 
done apart from the enactment of specific legis-
lation in 2006. Neither had the Government de-
monstrated that they had a clear policy for remo-
ving asbestos, as had been shown by the fact that 
asbestos was currently still to be found at a site 
at their former place of work, in a disused tun-
nel which had been walled up. Furthermore, the 
applicants highlighted the fact that the Govern-
ment's refusal to ratify the Asbestos Convention 
only showed their lack of sensitivity to the grave 
dangers of asbestos. 
 94.  In the applicants' view, the enactment of 
legislation without proper implementation, pre-
cautions and dissemination of information was 
not sufficient to exempt the State from its obliga-
tions. Moreover, there was no justification for the 
tardy legislative response. The applicants submit-
ted a list (twenty-four pages long) containing the 
titles of publications produced between 1912 and 
1997 concerning the hazardous effects of asbes-
ne personae with the provisions of the Convention 
within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a), and must 
be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 4. 
 85.  However, in the context of dangerous 
activities, the scope of the positive obligations 
under Article 2 of the Convention largely overlaps 
with that of those under Article 8 (see  Öneryıldız , 
cited above, §§ 90 and 160). The latter provision 
has allowed complaints of this nature to be exa-
mined where the circumstances were not such as 
to engage Article 2, but clearly affected a person's 
family and private life under Article 8 (see  L˹pez 
Ostra v. Spain , 9 December 1994, Series A no. 303-
C and  Guerra and Others , cited above). The Court 
therefore considers it appropriate to examine the 
complaints in respect of the remaining applicants 
under Article 8, which is applicable in the present 
case (see also  Roche v. the United Kingdom [GC], 
no. 32555/96, §§ 155-156, ECHR 2005-X). 
 (c)  Other admissibility issues 
 86.  The Court notes that it has jurisdiction 
 ratione temporis to deal with the complaints in so 
far as they relate to the period after 23 January 
1967, when the Convention entered into force in 
respect of Malta. 
 87.  The Court further notes that it has pre-
viously recognised the standing of the victim's 
next-of-kin to submit an application where the 
victim had died or disappeared in circumstances 
which were alleged to engage the responsibility 
of the State giving rise to issues under Article 2 
(see  Çakıcı v. Turkey [GC], no. 23657/94, § 92, 
ECHR 1999-IV, and  Bazorkina v. Russia (dec.), no. 
69481/01, 15 September 2005), it follows that 
the applicants in application no. 62338/11 have 
victim status in respect of the complaint under 
Article 2. 
 88.  Lastly, the Court notes that the relevant 
complaints are not manifestly ill-founded within 
the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Conventi-
on. It further notes that they are not inadmissible 
on any other grounds. 
 89.  It follows that the substantive complaint 
under Article 2 in respect of the applicants in ap-
plication no. 62338/11 and that under Article 8 
in respect of the applicants in applications nos. 
60908/11, 62110/11, 62129/11 and 62312/11 must 
be declared admissible. 
 90.  Given that the tests to be carried out un-
der Articles 2 and 8 are similar (see  Budayeva and 
Others , cited above, § 133), the Court will carry 
out its examination of the complaints under the-
se Articles together. 
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vernment had become aware of the hazardous 
nature of the material, employees who chose to 
work on such ships had been given an allowance 
as compensation. However, the Government 
pointed out that it was impossible for a country 
to be totally asbestos-free and for a worker never 
to come in contact with the material, particularly 
a worker in the shipbuilding or ship repair sector. 
They contended that anyone employed in such a 
work environment would be fully aware of the 
hazards involved. 
 97.  The Government noted that Malta had 
not ratified all the ILO conventions, and of the six-
ty-one it had ratified, only fifty-four were in force. 
In particular, Malta had not ratified the ILO 1986 
Asbestos Convention (which had come into force 
in 1989, having been ratified by thirty-five States 
at the time) and consequently it had not been 
bound to implement its measures or recommen-
dations. Nevertheless, the subsidiary legislation 
(mentioned above), enacted for the purposes, had 
been in line with the WHO guidelines. 
 98.  The Government accepted that the ap-
plicants had been employed at the dockyard in 
the 1950s and had continued their career there, 
but noted that the MDC was now in liquidation. 
Consequently it was difficult for the Government 
to provide any information about the extent of 
any information material given to the applicants 
at the time, since those persons administering 
the company at the time had by now retired or 
died. In any event the Government considered 
that they had not been responsible for not having 
disseminated information before the dangers of 
asbestos were known and generally accepted as 
correctly ascertained. Distinguishing the instant 
case from  Guerra and Others (cited above), they 
pointed out that no reports existed in this case. 
Moreover, the Government contended that the 
legislative enactments contained sufficient infor-
mation and warnings to employees. 
 99.  In the Government's view, while a State 
was required to take preventive measures to pro-
tect individuals from risks to their life, there was 
a margin of appreciation left to the State in ba-
lancing the competing interests involved. In their 
view the legislative enactments, coupled with 
protective clothing (implying the provision of in-
formation), namely a mask similar to those used 
by workers exposed to volatile material — which 
admittedly could not be compared to modern 
equipment but which the Government had con-
sidered adequate for those days — had satisfied 
their obligations under Article 2. Moreover, the 
applicants had not proved that there had been 
any better equipment available at the time to 
protect employees. 
tos. They claimed that most of these publications 
had been routinely available, as from the 1940s, 
to Maltese medical students (who had often also 
studied in Britain), let alone doctors and the Go-
vernment. Nevertheless, legislative action only 
came to pass over fifty years later. Moreover, until 
the end of the century, asbestos-laden ships had 
freely entered the ship repair facilities and wor-
kers had been instructed to work on them. 
 (ii)  The Government 
 95.  The Government pointed out that until a 
few decades ago asbestos had been one of natu-
re's best raw materials, being widely used in the 
building, construction and shipbuilding indus-
tries to insulate boilers, steam pipes and hot wa-
ter pipes. After it was established that it probably 
caused latent effects on the lungs of those who 
came into contact with it, there was initially a 
slow reaction worldwide, but that had since gat-
hered momentum. The Government argued that 
the dangers associated with asbestos had only 
come to the fore in the late 1970s at international 
level, and at that time the means of communica-
tion and disseminating information were not as 
prolific as they were today. They pointed out that 
the applicants had failed to prove that the publi-
cations they referred to had been available to the 
Government, medical practitioners and medical 
students. 
 96.  Nonetheless, once the Government had 
become aware of the dangers associated with 
asbestos, they had embarked on an exercise to 
phase out the material, and legislation had been 
enacted to terminate the importation of asbestos 
into Malta. Laws were passed in order to protect 
employees from the dangers of asbestos expo-
sure as early as 1987 (and not 2006 as claimed 
by the applicants) in the form of the Work Place 
(Health, Safety and Welfare) Regulations, which 
had entered into force on 9 February 1987, the 
Protection of Workers from the Risks related to 
Exposure to Carcinogens or Mutagens at Work 
Regulations, which had entered into force on 16 
May 2003, and the Protection of Workers from 
the Risks related to Exposure to Asbestos at Work 
Regulations, which had entered into force on 15 
December 2006 (see ‘Relevant domestic law’ abo-
ve). Furthermore, according to the Government, 
the Occupational Health and Safety Authority 
provided preventive information and guidelines 
concerning the management and use of asbestos 
material. In particular, they highlighted the fact 
that in the late 1990s a sophisticated asbestos re-
moval operation had been carried out at MDC on 
vessels undergoing repairs. The Government de-
nied that the employees had been made to work 
on asbestos-laden ships, noting that after the Go-
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technical aspects of the activity in question, 
for identifying shortcomings in the processes 
concerned and any errors committed by those 
responsible at different levels (see  Öneryıldız , 
cited above, §§ 89-90, and  Budayeva and 
Others , cited above, § 132). 
 As to the choice of particular practical measu-
res, the Court has consistently held that where 
the State is required to take positive measures, 
the choice of means is in principle a matter 
that falls within the Contracting State's margin 
of appreciation. There are different avenues to 
ensure Convention rights, and even if the Sta-
te has failed to apply one particular measure 
provided by domestic law, it may still fulfil its 
positive duty by other means. In this respect 
an impossible or disproportionate burden 
must not be imposed on the authorities wit-
hout consideration being given, in particular, 
to the operational choices which they must 
make in terms of priorities and resources; this 
results from the wide margin of appreciation 
States enjoy, as the Court has previously held, 
in difficult social and technical spheres (see 
 Budayeva and Others , cited above, §§ 134-35). 
 In assessing whether the respondent State 
complied with its positive obligation, the 
Court must consider the particular circums-
tances of the case, regard being had, among 
other elements, to the domestic legality of 
the authorities' acts or omissions, the domes-
tic decision-making process, including the 
appropriate investigations and studies, and 
the complexity of the issue, especially where 
conflicting Convention interests are involved. 
The scope of the positive obligations imputa-
ble to the State in the particular circumstan-
ces would depend on the origin of the threat 
and the extent to which one or the other risk 
is susceptible to mitigation (see  Budayeva and 
Others , cited above, §§ 136-37).” 
 102.  The Court has also held on many occa-
sions that the State has a positive duty to take 
reasonable and appropriate measures to secure 
an applicant's rights under Article 8 of the Con-
vention (see, among many other authorities, 
 López Ostra , cited above, § 51, Series A no. 303-C; 
 Powell and Rayner v. the United Kingdom , 21 Fe-
bruary 1990, § 41, Series A no. 172; and, more re-
cently,  Di Sarno and Others v. Italy , no. 30765/08, 
§ 96, 10 January 2012). In particular, the Court has 
affirmed a positive obligation of States, in relation 
to Article 8, to provide access to essential infor-
mation enabling individuals to assess risks to 
their health and lives (see, by implication,  Guerra 
and Others , cited above, §§ 57-60;  López Ostra , ci-
ted above, § 55;  McGinley and Egan , cited above, 
§§ 98-104; and  Roche , cited above, §§ 157-69). In 
 100.  Similarly, the Government submitted 
that they had fulfilled their positive obligati-
ons under Article 8 since, as soon as awareness 
of the harmful effects of asbestos exposure had 
been raised, legislation had been put in place to 
regulate its use in the workplace, to ban its im-
portation, and to remove it from the shipbuilding 
process. Moreover, the employees had been given 
masks to minimise damage and had been paid an 
allowance by the ship owners to compensate for 
the risk they were exposed to. 
 (b)  The Court's assessment 
 (i)  General principles 
 101.  The Court makes reference to its gene-
ral principles as stated in  Öneryıldız and further 
elaborated on in  Budayeva and Others (both cited 
above), as summarised in  Kolyadenko and Others 
v. Russia , nos. 17423/05, 20534/05, 20678/05, 
23263/05, 24283/05 and 35673/05, §§ 157-161, 
28 February 2012, and as reiterated in  Vilnes and 
Others v. Norway , nos. 52806/09 and 22703/10, 
§ 220, 5 December 2013: 
 “The Court reiterates that the positive obliga-
tion to take all appropriate steps to safeguard 
life for the purposes of Article 2 (see para-
graph 151 above) entails above all a primary 
duty on the State to put in place a legislative 
and administrative framework designed to 
provide effective deterrence against threats 
to the right to life (see  Öneryıldız , cited above, 
§ 89, and  Budayeva and Others , cited above, 
§ 129). 
 The Court considers that this obligation must 
be construed as applying in the context of any 
activity, whether public or not, in which the 
right to life may be at stake, and a fortiori in 
the case of industrial activities, which by their 
very nature are dangerous. In the particular 
context of dangerous activities special emp-
hasis must be placed on regulations geared to 
the special features of the activity in question, 
particularly with regard to the level of the po-
tential risk to human lives. They must govern 
the licensing, setting up, operation, security 
and supervision of the activity and must make 
it compulsory for all those concerned to take 
practical measures to ensure the effective pro-
tection of citizens whose lives might be en-
dangered by the inherent risks (see  Öneryıldız , 
cited above, §§ 71 and 90). 
 Among these preventive measures particular 
emphasis should be placed on the public's 
right to information, as established in the 
case-law of the Convention institutions. The 
relevant regulations must also provide for ap-
propriate procedures, taking into account the 
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 The Court acknowledges that the ILO Asbestos 
Recommendation and subsequent Convention 
which contained the minimum standards appli-
cable concerning the use of asbestos were adop-
ted in 1986. Nevertheless, as in many cases, the 
adoption of such texts comes after considerable 
preparatory work which may take significant 
time, and in the ambit of the ILO after having 
undertaken meetings with representatives of 
governments, and employers' and workers' orga-
nisations of all member countries of the organi-
sation. They are usually preceded by a number of 
guidelines, and before concrete proposals can be 
made there is a thorough search for a consensus 
between the stake holders, namely public autho-
rities as well as employers and workers. It is also 
common knowledge that the issues surrounding 
asbestos have been greatly debated amongst sta-
keholders all over the world, and that given the 
interests involved, particularly economic and 
commercial ones, acknowledging its harmful ef-
fects has not been easy. In this connection the 
Court observes that up to this date a number of 
countries have not yet banned the substance and 
only thirty-five countries out of the one hundred 
and ninety-eight United Nations Member States 
have ratified the Asbestos Convention. It appears 
logical, that this cannot be taken to mean that the 
dangers of asbestos are today still unknown. 
 106.  Thus, as to whether the Maltese Govern-
ment knew or ought to have known in the early 
seventies, the Court must rely on other factors, 
most evident amongst them being objective sci-
entific research, particularly in the light of the 
domestic context. The Court takes account of the 
list, submitted by the applicants, which contains 
references to hundreds of articles or other publi-
cations concerning the subject at issue published 
from 1930 onwards — many of them taken from 
reputable British medical journals. The Court ob-
serves that medical studies at the then Royal Uni-
versity of Malta were modelled on, and followed 
closely upon, the corresponding United Kingdom 
system, with many graduates in medicine con-
tinuing their studies in England and Scotland. 
Particularly in view of this situation, even accep-
ting the Government's argument — that is, that 
information was at the time not as readily avai-
lable as it is today — it is inconceivable that there 
was no access to any such sources of information, 
at least, if by no one else, by the highest medical 
authorities in the country, notably the Chief Go-
vernment Medical Officer and Superintendent 
of Public Health (as provided for in the, now 
repealed, Department of Health (Constitution) 
Ordinance, Chapter 94 of the Laws of Malta, see 
paragraph 42 above). In fact, according to Maltese 
law it was precisely the duty of the Superinten-
the Court's view, this obligation may in certain 
circumstances also encompass a duty to provide 
such information (see, by implication,  Guerra 
and Others , cited above, §§ 57-60; and  Vilnes and 
Others , cited above § 235). It has also recognised 
that in the context of dangerous activities, the 
scopes of the positive obligations under Articles 
2 and 8 of the Convention largely overlap (see 
 Budayeva and Others , cited above, § 133). Indeed, 
the positive obligation under Article 8 requires 
the national authorities to take the same practical 
measures as those expected of them in the con-
text of their positive obligation under Article 2 of 
the Convention (see  Kolyadenko and Others , cited 
above, § 216). 
 (ii)  Application to the present case 
 103.  In the absence of more detail in the Go-
vernment's submissions, the Court will assess the 
case on the basis of the material available to it. 
 104.  On the basis of the material in its pos-
session, the Court considers it established that 
the applicants in applications nos. 60908/11, 
62110/11, 62129/11 and 62312/11 and Mr Attard 
(hereinafter ‘the applicants’ for ease of reference) 
were exposed to asbestos during their careers 
as employees at the ship repair yard run by the 
MDC. Indeed, while admitting that all workers 
were exposed to some extent, the Government 
contended that after they had become aware of 
the relevant dangers, they had ensured that the 
applicants were not made to work on asbestos-
laden ships, without submitting what other pos-
sible functions or work they had been assigned at 
their place of work or any details regarding the 
dates when they had ceased to work with such 
material. Given the information and documents 
available, the Court finds no reason to doubt the 
applicants' assertions as to their working history. 
 105.  The Court must also consider whether 
the Government knew or ought to have known 
of the dangers arising from exposure to asbestos 
at the relevant time (from the entry into force of 
the Convention for Malta in 1967 onwards) (see, 
in a different context,  O'Keeffe v. Ireland [GC] no. 
35810/09, 28 January 2014, §§ 152 and 168). In 
this connection the Court notes that the Govern-
ment implicitly admitted to have known of these 
dangers in or around 1987, as they stated that as 
soon as they had become aware of the dangers 
associated with asbestos, laws were enacted to 
protect employees from these dangers as early as 
1987. Nevertheless, given that Mr Attard had left 
the dry docks in 1974, the Court must examine 
whether at the time while he was exposed, that 
is, at least in the early 1970s, the Government 
knew or ought to have known of the relevant 
dangers. 
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or material which is toxic without the approval 
of the Superintendent of Public Health. The Go-
vernment did not find it expedient to explain 
whether such approval had been sought or given 
for asbestos and, if so, on what grounds. Even if 
approval was given, by the Government's impli-
cit admission, asbestos continued to be used and 
employees continued to work on it. 
 Pursuant to Regulation 18, it was the duty of 
the employer to ensure that the atmosphere in 
workrooms in which potentially dangerous or 
obnoxious substances were handled or used was 
tested periodically to ensure that,  inter alia , toxic 
or irritating fibres were not present in quantities 
that could injure health, and to maintain an at-
mosphere fit for respiration. Moreover, no work 
should have been carried out unless such tests 
had been done. Again, the Government have not 
indicated that any such tests had ever been car-
ried out in the workrooms (or elsewhere) where 
the applicants, like the other employees, had 
been exposed to asbestos. 
 Apart from the above-mentioned regulations 
(16 and 18), the Work Places (Health, Safety and 
Welfare) Regulations made no provision for any 
other practical measures which could or should 
have been taken in order to protect the appli-
cants, nor were there any provisions concerning 
the right to access information. It was only the le-
gislation enacted in 2003 and 2006 which intro-
duced such measures, including (but not limited 
to) the duty to provide the applicants and people 
in their situation with information about the risks 
to health and safety which they were facing. 
 110.  The Court considers that enacting spe-
cific legislation fifteen years after the time in the 
mid-1980s when the Government accept that 
they were aware of the risks can hardly be seen as 
an adequate response in terms of fulfilling a Sta-
te's positive obligations. Furthermore, by the time 
the 2002, 2003 and 2006 legislation had been 
enacted and came into force (see paragraphs 33 
and 34 above), the applicants had little if any-
thing to gain since the timing coincided with the 
end of their careers, when they were leaving or 
had already left Malta Drydocks (see paragraph 6 
above). 
 111.  Consequently, from the information pro-
vided, it is apparent that from the mid-1980s to 
the early 2000s, when the applicants (except for 
Mr Attard) left the MDC, the legislation was defi-
cient in so far as it neither adequately regulated 
the operation of the asbestos-related activities 
nor provided any practical measures to ensure 
the effective protection of the employees whose 
lives might have been endangered by the inhe-
rent risk of exposure to asbestos. Moreover, even 
the limited protection afforded by that legislation 
dent of Public Health to remain abreast of such 
developments and advise the Government accor-
dingly. The Court, further, observes that it has not 
been submitted that there had been any specific 
impediment to access the necessary information. 
Furthermore, the Government failed to rebut the 
applicants' assertion with any signed statement 
by a medical expert or authority, who could have 
attested that the medical professionals in the 
country were, in or around the 1970s, unaware of 
these worrying medically related findings at the 
time. 
 Moreover, the  Pellicano judgment by the Com-
mercial Court (see paragraph 35 above) is in it-
self an implicit acknowledgement by a domestic 
court that in the years preceding Mr Pellicano's 
death in 1979 the authorities knew or ought to 
have known of the dangers of working with as-
bestos and that they had failed to provide ade-
quate health and safety measures in that respect. 
 Against this background, the Court concludes 
that for the purposes of the present case, it suf-
fices to consider that the Maltese Government 
knew or ought to have known of the dangers 
arising from exposure to asbestos at least as from 
the early 1970s. 
 107.  As to the fulfillment of the ensuing obli-
gations, as stated above, the respondent Govern-
ment claimed that as soon as they had become 
aware of the dangers associated with asbestos, 
laws were enacted to protect employees from 
these dangers and this as early as 1987 by means 
of the Work Place (Health, Safety and Welfare) 
Regulations. It follows that, by Government's 
admission, up until 1987 no positive action was 
taken in the nearly two decades (four years in 
the case of Mr. Attard who left the MDC in 1974) 
during which the applicants had been exposed to 
asbestos. 
 108.  As to the steps taken after 1987, the Court 
firstly notes that the mentioned regulations make 
no reference to asbestos, unlike the later legisla-
tion which was enacted for that precise purpose. 
Consequently, it is difficult to accept the Gover-
nment's argument that the Work Place (Health, 
Safety and Welfare) Regulations were the first 
proactive attempt to safeguard the applicants 
against these dangers by means of legislation. 
 109.  However, even assuming that the Work 
Places (Health, Safety and Welfare) Regulations 
were indeed a legislative reaction to the dangers 
of asbestos exposure and that, therefore, the Go-
vernment treated asbestos as falling into the ca-
tegory of a ‘toxic material’ or ‘dangerous substan-
ce’ for the purposes of that legislation, the Court 
notes the following. 
 In accordance with Regulation 16, no em-
ployer may use or suffer to be used any chemical 
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at the OHSA, the Court notes that this authority 
was only created after the year 2000 and it could 
therefore not have been a source of information 
before that date. It follows that in practice no ade-
quate information was in fact provided or made 
accessible to the applicants during the relevant 
period of their careers at the MDC. 
 115.  Lastly, the Court notes that the Govern-
ment submitted a general statement to the effect 
that employees who had worked on asbestos 
(after its dangers became known to the Gover-
nment) were offered compensation or a special 
allowance to perform such work. The Court firstly 
draws attention to the domestic case-law on the 
matter (see paragraph 34 above). But more im-
portantly, it notes that the Government have not 
provided any relevant information specific to the 
instant case. They did not submit whether the 
applicants in the present case had been entitled 
to such compensation and if so whether they 
had accepted it or received it. Neither has it been 
submitted or shown that, because they were not 
working on asbestos from a specific date on-
wards, they were not entitled to compensation. 
Nor did the Government submit any informa-
tion as to when such compensation had in fact 
become available. In that light, such an abstract 
affirmation can have no bearing on the Court's 
conclusion. 
 116.  The above considerations lead the Court 
to conclude that in view of the seriousness of the 
threat at issue, despite the State's margin of ap-
preciation as to the choice of means, the Govern-
ment have failed to satisfy their positive obligati-
ons, to legislate or take other practical measures, 
under Articles 2 and 8 in the circumstances of the 
present case. 
 117.  It follows that there has been a violation 
of Article 2 in respect of the applicants in applica-
tion no. 62338/11 relating to the death of Mr At-
tard and a violation of Article 8 in respect of the 
remaining applicants. 
 B. The procedural complaint under Article 2 
 118.  In their applications, the applicants also 
appeared to complain — albeit in unclear terms 
— that the Government had failed to investigate 
the circumstances of the case and prosecute 
those responsible, in violation of their procedu-
ral obligations under Article 2 of the Convention. 
They contended that the very knowledge that 
people were dying of malignant mesothelioma 
(as shown from death certificates which were 
publicly available) should have prompted the au-
thorities to take the necessary steps and comply 
with their duty to investigate and institute some 
sort of proceedings against those responsible. The 
State's inability to point to any such action was 
had no impact on the applicants since it appears 
to have remained unenforced. 
 112.  The Court considers that, while there is 
a primary duty to put in place a legislative and 
administrative framework, it cannot rule out the 
possibility,  a priori , that in certain specific circum-
stances, in the absence of the relevant legal pro-
visions, positive obligations may nonetheless be 
fulfilled in practice. In the present case, however, 
the only practical measure that appears to have 
been taken by the State, as the employer, was 
to distribute masks, on unspecified dates and at 
unspecified intervals (if distributed repeatedly at 
all). The Court notes in this connection that the 
apparently disposable masks (which were shown 
to the Court) were considered by experts in the 
 Pellicano case to be of ‘inadequate quality’ and 
 ‘did not take sufficient account of the state of sci-
entific knowledge about the subject matter at the 
relevant time’ (see paragraph 33 above). These 
findings are sufficient for the Court to conclude 
that such practical attempts left much to be de-
sired. 
 113.  As to the duty to provide access to es-
sential information enabling individuals to as-
sess risks to their health and lives and the duty 
to provide such information, the Court notes that 
the Government submitted that no information 
reports were in fact available and that it was dif-
ficult for them to provide any information about 
the extent of any informative material given to 
the applicants. They noted, however, that the Oc-
cupational Health and Safety Authority (OHSA) 
provided preventive information and guidelines 
concerning the management and use of asbestos. 
 114.  It would therefore appear that no infor-
mation was ever collected or studies underta-
ken or reports compiled specifically about the 
asbestos situation at the applicants' place of 
work. Furthermore, the Government did not even 
argue that any general information was, in fact, 
accessible or made available to the applicants. 
Instead the Government, seemingly oblivious 
to the obligations arising from the Convention, 
opted to consider that it was not their respon-
sibility to provide information at the outset and 
that anyone in such a work environment would 
in any case be fully aware of the hazards involved. 
The Court considers the latter statement to be in 
stark contrast to the Government's repeated ar-
gument that they (despite being employers and 
therefore well acquainted with such an envi-
ronment) were for long unaware of the dangers. 
The Court further finds inappropriate the Gover-
nment's contention that the distribution of the 
above-mentioned masks was an implicit source 
of information. Additionally, in relation to the Go-
vernment's reference to the information available 
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phenomena that might have caused such in-
cidents.” 
 123.  It follows that, although in most cases 
requiring an investigation a complaint is genera-
lly lodged with the authorities in order to obtain 
such an investigation, it is not mandatory in cases 
where the authorities are better placed to know 
about the original cause of the claim. 
 124.  The Court notes that the present case 
concerns a death that did not result from one 
particular instance but rather from circumstan-
ces which were spread over a number of decades, 
and which did not ensue from uncertain conditi-
ons — indeed, the State's responsibility has been 
established by the domestic courts in similar cir-
cumstances even where there was no investiga-
tion. In fact the Pellicano case was decided, in so 
far as responsibility in concerned, in 1989 and Mr 
Attard died in 2006. There is no doubt that during 
that period information about asbestos related 
consequences was publicly available. 
 125.  It follows that it cannot be said that the 
circumstances of Mr Attard's death were con-
fined within the knowledge of state officials and 
therefore that the Government should have con-
ducted an investigation  ex officio. 
 126.  The Court further notes that there was 
nothing preventing the applicants from lodging a 
complaint in order to bring their concerns to the 
Government's attention. In these circumstances, 
the applicants in application no. 62338/11 should 
have at least lodged a complaint with the relevant 
authorities concerning the death of Mr Attard and 
requested an investigation and the prosecution of 
those responsible. However, no such action was 
undertaken by the applicants. 
 127.  It follows that this part of the complaint 
must be rejected under Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of 
the Convention for non-exhaustion of domestic 
remedies. 
 IV. Alleged violation of article 3 of the Conven-
tion 
 128.  The applicants complained that the Go-
vernment had failed to protect them from suf-
fering inhuman and degrading treatment within 
the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention, which 
reads: 
 “No one shall be subjected to torture or to 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-
ment.” 
 129.  The Government argued that it was evi-
dent that they had fulfilled their positive obligati-
ons under Article 3 but they in any event submit-
ted that no evidence had been produced by the 
applicants to prove that they had been ill-treated 
or tortured or subjected to any degrading treat-
ment. 
tantamount to an admission of their failure to 
comply with their procedural obligations under 
Article 2. 
 119.  The Government argued that it was in-
cumbent on the victims or their heirs to institute 
proceedings before the ordinary domestic courts 
and to prove the link between asbestos exposure 
and the damage claimed. Moreover, the Gover-
nment had been aware of only two deaths con-
nected with the subject matter, namely those of 
Mr Pellicano and Mr Attard, which had occurred 
after the dry docks had ceased operating. 
 120.  The Court reiterates that the provision is 
applicable only in respect of the applicants in ap-
plication no. 62338/11 relating to the death of Mr 
Attard. 
 121.  The Court observes that — unlike in 
medical negligence cases, where a civil remedy 
may suffice (see  Calvelli and Ciglio v. Italy [GC], 
no. 32967/96, § 51, ECHR 2002-I) — in cases con-
cerning incidents resulting from dangerous acti-
vities under Article 2, the competent authorities 
must act with exemplary diligence and prompt-
ness and must of their own motion initiate in-
vestigations capable of, firstly, ascertaining the 
circumstances in which the incident took place 
and any shortcomings in the operation of the 
regulatory system and, secondly, identifying the 
State officials or authorities involved in any capa-
city whatsoever in the chain of events concerned 
(see  Öneryıldız , cited above, § 94 and  Budayeva , 
cited above, § 142). 
 122.  In  Öneryıldız (deaths resulting from a 
landslide caused by a methane explosion) the 
Court in fact adopted that approach after it had 
found the following § 93: 
 “It should be pointed out that in cases of ho-
micide the interpretation of Article 2 as en-
tailing an obligation to conduct an official 
investigation is justified not only because any 
allegations of such an offence normally give 
rise to criminal liability (see  Caraher v. the Uni-
ted Kingdom (dec.), no. 24520/94, ECHR 2000-
I), but also because often, in practice, the true 
circumstances of the death are, or may be, 
largely confined within the knowledge of 
State officials or authorities (see  McCann and 
Others v. the United Kingdom , judgment of 27 
September 1995, Series A no. 324, pp. 47-49, 
§§ 157-64, and  òlhan , cited above, § 91). 
 In the Court's view, such considerations are 
indisputably valid in the context of dangerous 
activities, when lives have been lost as a result 
of events occurring under the responsibility 
of the public authorities, which are often the 
only entities to have sufficient relevant know-
ledge to identify and establish the complex 
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plain about the matter, and the Constitutional 
Court would have had the competence and ne-
cessary impartiality to examine it. Furthermore, 
they contended that the applicants had in fact 
had an effective remedy for the purposes of Arti-
cles 2 and 3 of the Convention, namely an action 
in tort. They referred to their observations for the 
purposes of their plea of non-exhaustion of do-
mestic remedies. 
 136.  The Court firstly notes that it has already 
established in the context of Maltese cases be-
fore it that even though Maltese domestic law 
provides for a remedy against a final judgment 
of the Constitutional Court, the length of the pro-
ceedings detracts from the effectiveness of that 
remedy and, in view of the specific situation of 
the Constitutional Court in the domestic legal 
order, this is not a remedy which needs to be 
used in order to fulfil the exhaustion requirement 
(see  Saliba and Others v. Malta , no. 20287/10, 
§ 78, 22 November 2011 and  Bellizzi v. Malta , no. 
46575/09, § 44, 21 June 2011). Thus, contrary to 
the Government's arguments, the applicants are 
entitled to raise their complaint before the Court 
at this stage. 
 137.  The Court reiterates that Article 13 gua-
rantees the availability at national level of a re-
medy to enforce the substance of the Convention 
rights and freedoms in whatever form they might 
happen to be secured in the domestic legal order. 
The remedy required by Article 13 must be ‘ef-
fective’ in practice as well as in law. In particular, 
its exercise must not be unjustifiably hindered by 
the acts or omissions of the authorities of the res-
pondent State (see  Aksoy v. Turkey , 18 December 
1996, § 95,  Reports 1996-VI, and  Aydın v. Turkey , 
25 September 1997, § 103,  Reports 1997-VI). Ho-
wever, the effectiveness of a remedy within the 
meaning of Article 13 does not depend on the 
certainty of a favourable outcome for the appli-
cant (see  Sürmeli v. Germany [GC], no. 75529/01, 
§ 98, ECHR 2006-VII), and the mere fact that an 
applicant's claim fails is not in itself sufficient to 
render the remedy ineffective ( Amann v. Switzer-
land , [GC], no. 27798/95, §§ 88-89, ECHR 2002-II). 
 138.  In relation to the complaint in conjunc-
tion with Articles 2 and 8, the Court has already 
explained in paragraph 63 above that an effective 
remedy existed (contrast  Di Sarno , cited above, 
§ 118). The fact that the use of that remedy did 
not lead to a finding in favour of the applicants or 
remained unused in the particular circumstances 
does not render it ineffective. 
 139  In relation to the complaint in conjunc-
tion with Article 3, the Court reiterates that Arti-
cle 13 does not apply if there is no arguable claim. 
As it has found above, the complaints under that 
Article were either manifestly ill-founded or in-
 130.  Having examined the medical reports 
submitted by the applicants in applications nos. 
60908/11, 62110/11, 62129/11 and 62312/11, the 
Court considers that while the conditions in 
which those applicants have lived in recent years 
— which were even more severe in the case of 
Mr John Mary Abela — have undoubtedly caused 
some difficulties and discomfort, they cannot be 
considered to amount to degrading treatment 
within the meaning of Article 3 (see,  mutatis 
mutandis, López Ostra , cited above, § 60) and can-
not therefore trigger the state's positive obligati-
ons under that provision (see  Fadeyeva v. Russia 
(dec.), no. 55723/00, 16 October 2003). 
 131.  It follows that this complaint must be re-
jected as manifestly ill-founded pursuant to Arti-
cle 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention. 
 132.  In respect of the applicants in applica-
tion no. 62338/11, namely the relatives of the de-
ceased Mr Attard, the Court considers that — even 
assuming that the suffering of Mr Attard can be 
considered to have reached the relevant thres-
hold for the purposes of this provision — bearing 
in mind the findings in paragraph 113 above and 
the strictly personal nature of Article 3 and the 
complaint at issue, the circumstances of the pre-
sent case do not lead to the conclusion that the 
Article 3 claim is transferrable to the heirs on the 
grounds of either general interest or strong moral 
interest (see  Kaburov v. Bulgaria (dec.) §§ 56-57, 
19 June 2012). For these reasons, the applicants in 
application no. 62338/11 cannot be considered to 
have victim status in respect of this complaint. 
 133.  The Court considers that their complaint 
is therefore incompatible  ratione personae with 
the provisions of the Convention for the purposes 
of Article 35 § 3 (a) and must be rejected pursu-
ant to Article 35 § 4. 
 V. Alleged violation of article 13 of the Con-
vention 
 134.  The applicants complained of a violation 
of Article 13 in so far as the Constitutional Court 
judgment in their cases deprived them of an ef-
fective remedy under Article 13 in conjunction 
with Articles 2, 3 and 8 of the Convention. Article 
13 reads: 
 “Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set 
forth in [the] Convention are violated shall 
have an effective remedy before a national 
authority notwithstanding that the violation 
has been committed by persons acting in an 
official capacity.” 
 135.  The Government contested that argu-
ment. They argued that if the applicants were 
complaining about the judgment of the Constitu-
tional Court, they should have instituted a fresh 
set of constitutional redress proceedings to com-
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 A. Damage 
 147.  The applicants in applications nos. 
60908/11, 62110/11, 62129/11 and 62312/11 clai-
med € 40,000 (EUR) per applicant (except for Mr 
John Mary Abela who claimed € 70,000 given his 
specific condition) in respect of pecuniary dama-
ge in the form of biological damage to their lungs, 
loss of independence as a result of their impaired 
lung function and the need for regular visits to a 
lung specialist. In the case of Mr John Mary Abela 
this also covered fees incurred in relation to mo-
bility assistance. They also claimed € 100,000 per 
applicant in respect of non-pecuniary damage for 
the four alleged violations. 
 148.  The first applicant in application no. 
62338/11 claimed € 94,500 in respect of pecu-
niary damage. That sum included € 74,500 cove-
ring the pay Mr Attard would have received over 
the four years up to retirement had he not pas-
sed away at the age of sixty-one as a result of his 
asbestos-related disease (based on his annual pay 
in 2004 of approximately € 18,635, submitted to 
the Court) and an additional € 20,000 for main-
taining a home until his wife reached eighty years 
of age. The applicants in application no. 62338/11 
claimed € 120,000 each in respect of non-pecuni-
ary damage. 
 149.  The Government submitted that the 
computation of pecuniary damage in the ap-
plicants' cases was a matter for the domestic 
courts in ordinary civil proceedings and could 
not be based on data from an insurance website, 
which was what the applicants had utilised. The 
Government submitted that the applicants had, 
moreover, not provided proof of any such pecu-
niary damage. Furthermore, there was no causal 
link between the quantum of damages and the 
alleged hazard. As to the claims in respect of non-
pecuniary damage, the Government submitted 
that the mere finding of a violation would suffice 
— the underlying principle of human rights being 
to provide standards — and that if the Court con-
sidered that an award should be made in respect 
of non-pecuniary damage, it should not exceed 
€ 1,000 per applicant. 
 150.  The Court has accepted the link between 
the medical conditions affecting the relevant ap-
plicants and their exposure to asbestos during 
the time they worked at MDC, and it thus dis-
cerns a causal link between the violation found 
and some of their claims in respect of pecuniary 
damage. However, none of the applicants in ap-
plications nos. 60908/11, 62110/11, 62129/11 and 
62312/11 has substantiated these claims, which 
are therefore dismissed. In respect of the claims 
of the first applicant in application no. 62338/11, 
the Court notes that the retirement age in Malta 
is in fact sixty-one years of age and that there 
admissible  ratione personae . Consequently there 
was no such claim. It follows, that Article 13 is not 
applicable in conjunction with Article 3. 
 140.  In conclusion, the entirety of the com-
plaint under Article 13 is manifestly ill-founded 
within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Con-
vention and must be rejected pursuant to Article 
35 § 4. 
 VI. Other alleged violations of the Convention 
 141.  Lastly, the applicants also appear to be 
complaining that their families were equally vic-
tims of the above-mentioned provisions in so far 
as they were affected by the third-party transfer 
of asbestos particles. 
 142.  The Court notes that only the relatives 
of the deceased Mr Attard have applied to it. The 
relatives of the other applicants have not lodged 
any complaints with the Court. It follows that any 
complaint lodged by the other applicants on be-
half of their families — who have not themselves 
applied to be parties to the proceedings — must 
be rejected as incompatible  ratione personae with 
the provisions of the Convention within the me-
aning of Article 35 § 3 and must be rejected in ac-
cordance with Article 35 § 4. 
 143.  Thus, the complaint of which the Court 
takes cognisance can concern only the family of 
Mr Attard, namely the applicants in application 
no. 62338/11. 
 144.  The Court reiterates that severe environ-
mental pollution may affect individuals' well-
being and prevent them from enjoying their 
homes in such a way that their private and family 
life are adversely affected even without seriously 
endangering their health (see  L˹pez Ostra , cited 
above, § 51). However, in the present case, in so 
far as the complaint goes beyond that examined 
under Article 2 of the Convention, the Court 
considers that the complaint concerning the ap-
plicants in person does not appear to have been 
sufficiently developed before the domestic courts 
with constitutional jurisdiction. The same applies 
in respect of the applications lodged with the 
Court. 
 145.  The complaint is therefore manifestly ill-
founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of 
the Convention and must be rejected pursuant to 
Article 35 § 4. 
 VII. Application of article 41 of the Convention 
 146.  Article 41 of the Convention provides: 
 “If the Court finds that there has been a violati-
on of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, 
and if the internal law of the High Contracting 
Party concerned allows only partial reparation 
to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford 
just satisfaction to the injured party.” 
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 Application no. 62338/11: € 14,915 (compri-
sing € 7,154 as per the attached bill of costs, plus 
an additional € 1,388 in VAT for legal counsel and 
interest at 8%, together with extrajudicial fees to-
wards payment for legal counsel of € 4,248 (in-
clusive of VAT) in conjunction with the domestic 
proceedings, and € 2,124 — amounting to € 600 
per applicant, plus VAT — for proceedings before 
the Court). 
 153.  The Government did not contest the part 
of the claims concerning the costs incurred by the 
applicants before the domestic courts (as per the 
taxed bill) but they contested the part concerning 
the expenses payable in respect of the opposing 
parties (the Occupational Health and Safety Aut-
hority and the Government) since the applicants 
had not shown that those payments had actually 
been made. They further contended that no in-
terest was due on the judicial bill of costs. The 
Government further noted that all costs related 
to the domestic proceedings were included in 
the taxed bill of costs (including the lawyer's fees) 
and therefore no extrajudicial legal fees were 
due. Lastly, the Government noted that the ap-
plicants had claimed EUR 14,170 in total for the 
proceedings before the Court, but argued that, 
given that the applications had been dealt with 
together and that the applications and submis-
sions were identical, the Court should not award 
more than € 2,500 for proceedings before it. 
 154.  According to the Court's case-law, an 
applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of 
costs and expenses only in so far as it has been 
shown that these have been actually and neces-
sarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. 
The Court firstly notes that if any dues relating to 
the domestic proceedings are still unpaid, they 
remain payable to the relevant parties in accor-
dance with domestic law. In the present case, 
taking into account the documents in its posses-
sion and the above criteria, and in particular the 
fact that, as argued by the Government, legal fees 
are already included in the taxed bill of costs and 
the applications before the Court were treated 
jointly, the Court considers it reasonable to award 
the sum of € 6,000 per application covering costs 
under all heads. 
 C. Default interest 
 155.  The Court considers it appropriate that 
the default interest rate should be based on the 
marginal lending rate of the European Central 
Bank, to which should be added three percentage 
points. 
 For these reasons, the Court, unanimously, 
 1.  Decides to join the applications; 
was therefore no guarantee that Mr Attard would 
have worked any longer had he not passed away. 
Moreover, the Court sees no causal link between 
his wife's claim for household maintenance and 
the violations alleged. It follows that these claims 
are also dismissed. 
 151.  On the other hand, given the violations 
of either Article 2 or 8 of the Convention in the 
present case — which the mere finding of a viola-
tion in this judgment is not sufficient to remedy 
— the Court awards the applicants the following 
amounts in respect of non-pecuniary damage: 
 The applicants in application no. 62338/11, 
€ 30,000 in total; Mr John Mary Abela € 12,000; 
Mr Dyer, € 1,000; and the remaining applicants 
in applications nos. 60908/11, 62110/11, 62129/11 
and 62312/11, € 9,000 each. 
 B. Costs and expenses 
 152.  The applicants also claimed the following 
costs and expenses incurred before the domestic 
courts and the Court: 
 Application no. 60908/11: € 15,112 (compri-
sing € 4,302 as per the attached bill of costs plus 
an additional € 780 in VAT for legal counsel and 
interest at 8%, together with extrajudicial fees 
towards payment for legal counsel of € 7,080 (in-
clusive of VAT) in conjunction with the domestic 
proceedings, and € 2,950 — amounting to € 600 
per applicant, plus VAT — for proceedings before 
the Court). 
 Application no. 62110/11: € 13,467 (compri-
sing € 4,177 as per the attached bill of costs, plus 
an additional € 794 in VAT for legal counsel and 
interest at 8%, together with extrajudicial fees to-
wards payment for legal counsel of € 5,664 (in-
clusive of VAT) in conjunction with the domestic 
proceedings, and € 2,832 — amounting to € 600 
per applicant, plus VAT — for proceedings before 
the Court). 
 Application no. 62129/11: € 15,525 (compri-
sing € 4,163 as per the attached bill of costs, plus 
an additional € 742 in VAT for legal counsel and 
interest at 8%, together with extrajudicial fees 
towards payment for legal counsel of € 7,080 
(inclusive of VAT) in conjunction with the do-
mestic proceedings, and € 3,540 — amounting 
to EUR 600 per applicant, plus VAT — for pro-
ceedings before the Court). 
 Application no. 62312/11: € 13,499 (compri-
sing € 4,328 as per the attached bill of costs, plus 
an additional € 782 in VAT for legal counsel and 
interest at 8%, together with extrajudicial fees to-
wards payment for legal counsel of € 5,664 (in-
clusive of VAT) in conjunction with the domestic 
proceedings, and € 2,724 — amounting to € 600 
per applicant, plus VAT — for proceedings before 
the Court). 
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op het jarenlang gebruik van asbest bij dergelijke 
activiteiten. In casu gaat het om klagers (dan wel 
hun nabestaanden) die lange tijd werkzaam zijn 
geweest bij een scheepsreparatiewerf in handen 
van de Maltese overheid en waarbij zij aan asbest 
zijn blootgesteld. Deze kwestie is ook actueel voor 
Nederland, nu daar ook een zaak tegen de staat is 
aangespannen wegens het inadequaat optreden 
van de overheid tegen het gebruik van asbest in 
de scheepvaartindustrie (al dan niet in overheids-
eigendom). Verder valt op dat het Hof vrij soepel 
is waar het betreft het vereiste van uitputting van 
nationale rechtsmiddelen. De klagers hoeven zich 
niet eerst tot de civiele rechter te wenden, nu niet 
duidelijk is of zij daar ook vergoeding van im-
materiële schade kunnen krijgen. Het Hof was er 
kennelijk veel aan gelegen ten gronde uitspraak 
te kunnen doen over deze materie, waarbij juist 
ook een rol kan hebben gespeeld het feit dat het 
om een wijdverbreid probleem gaat. 
 2. In rechtsoverweging 101 haalt het Hof de 
kernoverwegingen uit zijn vaste jurisprudentie 
terzake aan. Die komt er — kort gezegd — op neer 
dat de overheid alle maatregelen (wetgevend dan 
wel bestuurlijk) moet nemen die mede gelet op 
de haar toekomende bevoegdheden redelijker-
wijs kunnen worden gevergd om te voorkomen 
dat een reële en directe levensbedreiging waar-
van zij op de hoogte is of zou behoren te zijn, zich 
verwezenlijkt. Hieronder valt ook de verplichting 
betrokkenen te informeren over het dreigende 
levensgevaar. In het bijzonder in de context van 
industriële activiteiten, of deze nu in de publieke 
sector plaatsvinden of niet, rust er een bijzondere 
verplichting op de overheid om via regelgeving 
en bestuurlijke maatregelen (vergunningver-
lening, toezicht), levensgevaarlijke situaties te 
voorkomen (onder verwijzing naar o.m. EHRM 30 
november 2004,  Öneryildiz t. Turkije ,  AB 2005/43 , 
m.nt. A.J.Th. Woltjer). Daarbij gaat het om ver-
plichtingen op grond van  artikel 2 EVRM (het 
recht op leven). 
 3. Het Hof overweegt dat er vergelijkbare 
verplichtingen kunnen worden afgeleid uit het 
recht op privéleven van  artikel 8 EVRM, in het 
bijzonder ook ten aanzien van het adequaat in-
formeren van betrokkenen over bepaalde ge-
zondheidsrisico’s. Los van de informatieplicht is 
dat een opmerkelijke stap die het Hof zet omdat 
in eerdere jurisprudentie bij levensbedreigende 
gevaren qua verplichtingen nog een verschil 
wordt gemaakt tussen  artikel 2 en 8 EVRM (ar-
tikel 8 EVRM laat normaal gesproken in ieder 
geval meer ruimte voor een belangenafweging bij 
de te kiezen maatregelen). Artikel 8 zou anders 
dan artikel 2 EVRM volgens het Hof gelden voor 
de klagers in kwestie die wel aan asbest gerela-
teerde gezondheidsklachten hebben, maar (nog) 
 2.  Declares the substantive complaint under 
Article 2 in respect of the applicants in application 
no. 62338/11 and that under Article 8 in respect 
of the applicants in applications nos. 60908/11, 
62110/11, 62129/11 and 62312/11 admissible and 
the remainder of the applications inadmissible; 
 3.  Holds that there has been a violation of 
Article 2 of the Convention under its substantive 
head in respect of the applicants in application 
no. 62338/11 concerning the death of Mr Attard; 
 4.  Holds that there has been a violation of 
Article 8 of the Convention in respect of the ap-
plicants in applications nos. 60908/11, 62110/11, 
62129/11 and 62312/11; 
 5.  Holds 
 (a)  that the respondent State is to pay the 
applicants, within three months from the date on 
which the judgment becomes final in accordance 
with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the follo-
wing amounts: 
 (i)  € 30,000 (thirty thousand euros) jointly 
to the applicants in application no. 62338/11, plus 
any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-
pecuniary damage; 
 (ii)  € 12,000 (twelve thousand euros) to Mr 
John Mary Abela, plus any tax that may be char-
geable in respect of non-pecuniary damage; 
 (iii)  € 1,000 (one thousand euros) to Mr Dyer, 
plus any tax that may be chargeable in respect of 
non-pecuniary damage; 
 (iv)  € 9,000 (nine thousand euros) to each of 
the remaining applicants, plus any tax that may 
be chargeable in respect of non-pecuniary da-
mage; 
 (v)  € 6,000 (six thousand euros) jointly to 
the group of applicants in each one of the applica-
tions, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the 
applicants, in respect of costs and expenses; 
 (b)  that from the expiry of the above-men-
tioned three months until settlement simple in-
terest shall be payable on the above amounts at 
a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the 
European Central Bank during the default period 
plus three percentage points; 
 6.  Dismisses the remainder of the appli-
cants' claim for just satisfaction. 
 Done in English, and notified in writing on 24 July 
2014, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules 
of Court. 
 Noot 
 1. De hier opgenomen uitspraak is in het bij-
zonder het vermelden waard, nu het Hof zijn ge-
vestigde jurisprudente inzake aansprakelijkheid 
van de overheid onder  artikel 2 EVRM voor le-
vensbedreigende industriële activiteiten toepast 
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ook, gezien de ernst van het gevaar in kwestie, dat 
Malta onvoldoende maatregelen heeft getroffen 
(via wetgeving of anderszins) om aan zijn positie-
ve verplichtingen op grond van de  artikelen 2 en 
 8 EVRM te voldoen. Terzijde: het valt op dat het 
Hof hier nalaat om te bezien wat hoogste rech-
ters van de verschillende verdragsstaten hebben 
beslist als het gaat om de datum waarop partijen 
op de hoogte (hadden moeten) zijn van het ge-
vaar dat samenhangt met asbest. Een dergelijke 
analyse had het oordeel van het Hof kunnen ver-
sterken. 
 5. Voor Nederland is van belang dat eind 
2013 de eerste ‘asbest-claim’ tegen de Nederland-
se staat is ingediend (na eerdere claims tegen pri-
vate ondernemingen). Een ex-werknemer uit de 
aluminiumindustrie in Vlissingen met asbestkan-
ker stelt de Nederlandse staat aansprakelijk voor 
zijn dodelijke ziekte. Tot deze stap komt hij om-
dat hij geen (voldoende) verhaal kan krijgen bij 
de private (en inmiddels failliete) werkgever van 
destijds. Hij stelt in het bijzonder dat de Neder-
landse staat nalatig is geweest en verzuimd heeft 
tijdig maatregelen te treffen ter bescherming van 
werknemers. Pas in 1993 werd het gebruik van 
asbest in Nederland verboden, terwijl de staat 
toen al veertig jaar op de hoogte zou zijn geweest 
van de risico's van asbest (vgl. berichtgeving in 
 NRC en  Trouw d.d. 13 november 2013). Ook voor 
Nederland kan gelden dat de overheid zeker 
vanaf begin jaren zeventig van de vorige eeuw op 
de hoogte was of had moeten zijn van de geva-
ren van asbest, terwijl mede door de lobby van de 
asbestindustrie een algeheel verbod op zich heeft 
laten wachten tot 1993. Afgewacht moet worden 
hoe deze zaak zich ontwikkelt, maar duidelijk is 
dat de hier opgenomen uitspraak argumenten 
biedt die de zaak van deze werknemer onder-
steunen. 
 6. Ten aanzien van de verjaring van asbest-
claims maakte de Hoge Raad al eerder duidelijk 
dat om redenen van redelijkheid en billijkheid 
vanwege de aard van de schade (die zich pas vaak 
na tientallen jaren manifesteert) de wettelijke 
termijn kan worden gepasseerd. Zie in dit ver-
band de twee asbestarresten van de Hoge Raad 
van 28 april 2000,  Erven van Hese/De Schelde — 
waarin de Hoge Raad aanleiding vond in de eisen 
van redelijkheid en billijkheid om de verjarings-
termijn niet toe te passen, aangezien de schade 
pas ontstond nadat de vordering was verjaard; in 
het andere geval —  Erven Rouwhof/Eternit — acht-
te de Hoge Raad hier geen gronden voor aanwe-
zig, aangezien de schade (kort) voor het moment 
van het verlopen van de verjaringstermijn aan 
het licht kwam. Vgl. ook Hoge Raad 25 juni 1999, 
 NJ 2000/16 , m.nt. A.R. Bloembergen (verjaring 
schadeclaim in verband met kindermishande-
niet met asbestkanker zijn gediagnosticeerd. 
Voor de nabestaanden van de voormalige werk-
nemer die inmiddels als gevolg van asbestkanker 
is overleden, toetst het Hof de verplichtingen van 
Malta onder artikel 2 EVRM. Ook dat is opmer-
kelijk nu in eerdere zaken niet zozeer de vraag of 
personen daadwerkelijk zijn overleden bepalend 
was voor de toepasselijkheid van artikel 2 EVRM 
maar veeleer de vraag of de overheid niet tegen 
een potentieel levensbedreigende situatie is op-
getreden, terwijl zij daarvan op de hoogte was 
of had moeten zijn (in die zin EHRM 28 februari 
2012  Kolyadenko t. Rusland ,  AB 2012/314 , m.nt. T. 
Barkhuysen en M.L. van Emmerik). Een verkla-
ring daarvoor zou nog kunnen zijn dat in de laatst 
bedoelde zaak er daadwerkelijk een levensbe-
dreigende situatie was opgetreden, terwijl in de 
onderhavige zaak er nog geen sprake is van een 
diagnose van levensbedreigende asbestkanker. 
Nu de wetenschap laat zien dat er een één op één 
verband is tussen werken met asbest en dit soort 
kankers en het gelet daarop misschien alleen 
maar wachten is op het zich openbaren van deze 
levensbedreigende ziekte, verklaart dat gegeven 
wellicht weer waarom het Hof in de hier opge-
nomen zaak zo makkelijk de verplichtingen van 
artikel 2 EVRM ook inleest in artikel 8 EVRM. 
 4. In casu is in het bijzonder interessant hoe 
het Hof nagaat vanaf wanneer de Maltese over-
heid op de hoogte was (of dat had moeten zijn) 
van het levensgevaar van asbest. Het Hof hecht 
hierbij belang aan een ILO-conventie inzake het 
gebruik van asbest uit 1986 (maar waarvoor de 
voorbereidingen veel eerder zijn begonnen en 
die overigens niet door Malta — ILO-lid sinds 4 
januari 1965 — is geratificeerd) en een nationale 
rechtszaak waarin een werkgever aansprake-
lijk werd gehouden voor het overlijden van een 
werknemer op zijn scheepswerf in 1979 ten ge-
volge van de blootstelling aan asbest. Voor het 
Hof lijkt echter doorslaggevend dat op basis van 
objectief wetenschappelijk onderzoek, zoals ook 
voor de autoriteiten beschikbaar binnen de Mal-
tese context (waarbij de Universiteit van Malta 
in nauw contact stond met het wetenschappe-
lijk discours in het Verenigd Koninkrijk, waar in 
gerespecteerde Britse medische tijdschriften al 
langer het verband werd gelegd tussen asbest en 
kanker (mesothelioom)), de Maltese overheid ten 
minste vanaf begin jaren 70 op de hoogte was (of 
had moeten zijn) van dit levensgevaar. Deson-
danks kwam zij pas in het begin van deze eeuw 
met beschermende wetgeving. Evenmin had de 
overheid in de tussentijd andere passende maat-
regelen (de verstrekte maskers bleken volgens 
experts in een nationale asbestprocedure van 
onvoldoende kwaliteit) getroffen om het levens-
gevaar te voorkomen. Het Hof concludeert dan 
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overschreden. De tweede alinea van deze bepaling 
vermeldt dat deze grenswaarden wat stikstofdi-
oxide en benzeen betreft ‘niet mogen worden over-
schreden’ vanaf het vastgestelde uiterste tijdstip, 
hetgeen overeenkomt met een resultaatsverplich-
ting.  Artikel 22 lid 1 van richtlijn 2008/50 moet 
in die zin worden uitgelegd dat het een lidstaat, 
teneinde het in deze richtlijn vastgestelde uiterste 
tijdstip voor naleving van de in bijlage XI vermelde 
grenswaarden voor stikstofdioxide met ten hoogste 
vijf jaar te kunnen uitstellen, verplicht daarom te 
verzoeken en een luchtkwaliteitsplan op te stellen, 
wanneer objectief blijkt dat, rekening gehouden met 
de bestaande gegevens en ondanks het feit dat deze 
lidstaat adequate maatregelen ter bestrijding van 
verontreiniging toepast, overeenstemming met deze 
grenswaarden in een gegeven zone of agglomeratie 
niet vanaf het genoemde uiterste tijdstip kan wor-
den bereikt. Richtlijn 2008/50 bevat geen enkele 
uitzondering op de uit artikel 22 lid 1 voortvloei-
ende verplichting. Uit  artikel 23 lid 1 alinea 2 van 
richtlijn 2008/50 volgt dat een lidstaat, wanneer 
de overschrijding van de grenswaarden voor stik-
stofdioxide plaatsvindt na het uiterste tijdstip voor 
naleving ervan, gehouden is een luchtkwaliteitsplan 
op te stellen dat aan bepaalde vereisten voldoet. De 
opvatting volgens welke een lidstaat in omstandig-
heden als die van het hoofdgeding volledig aan de 
uit artikel 13 lid 1 alinea 2 van richtlijn 2008/50 
voortvloeiende verplichtingen zou hebben voldaan 
louter omdat een dergelijk plan is opgesteld, kan 
niet worden aanvaard. Natuurlijke personen of 
rechtspersonen die rechtstreeks worden getroffen 
door de overschrijding van de grenswaarden na 1 
januari 2010, moeten kunnen bewerkstelligen, in 
voorkomend geval door beroep in te stellen bij de 
bevoegde rechterlijke instanties, dat de nationale 
autoriteiten een luchtkwaliteitsplan opstellen in 
overeenstemming met artikel 23 lid 1 alinea 2 van 
richtlijn 2008/50, wanneer een lidstaat de uit artikel 
13 lid 1 alinea 2 van deze richtlijn voortvloeiende 
vereisten niet in acht heeft genomen. Wat de inhoud 
van dat plan betreft, volgt uit artikel 23 lid 1 alinea 
2 van richtlijn 2008/50 dat de lidstaten weliswaar 
over een beoordelingsmarge beschikken om te be-
palen welke maatregelen zij zullen vaststellen, doch 
deze moeten hoe dan ook van dien aard zijn dat de 
periode van overschrijding van de grenswaarden 
daarmee zo kort mogelijk kan worden gehouden. 
 ClientEarth, 
 tegen 
 The Secretary of State for the Environment, Food 
and Rural Affairs. 
ling). In zoverre hoeft Nederland geen proble-
men te ondervinden zoals die aan de orde waren 
in de asbestzaak die aanleiding gaf tot EHRM 11 
maart 2014,  Howald Moor e.a. t. Zwitserland ,  EHRC 
2014/164, m.nt. J.M. Emaus. Daar maakte het Hof 
uit dat de strikte toepassing van de Zwitserse ver-
jaringsregeling in een asbestzaak de toegang tot 
de rechter in strijd met  artikel 6 EVRM blokkeer-
de. Cruciaal daarin was de lange tijd die het kan 
duren voordat de asbestkanker zich openbaart en 
de korte absolute verjaringstermijn van tien jaar 
te rekenen vanaf het moment van de schadever-
oorzakende gebeurtenis. In antwoord op kamer-
vragen van het Kamerlid De Wit d.d. 1 mei 2014 
( Aanhangsel Handelingen II 2013/14, nr. 1758) 
komt de minister van V&J tot een vergelijkbare 
conclusie: “Ik meen dat het Nederlandse stelsel 
voor asbest-gerelateerde vorderingen voor bloot-
stellingen vóór 1 februari 2004 in overeenstem-
ming is met artikel 6 EVRM en de uitleg daarvan 
door het EHRM in de zaak  Moor . De combinatie 
van een lange absolute verjaringstermijn van der-
tig jaar van  artikel 3:310 lid 2 BW, een uitgebreide 
voorschotregeling voor asbestslachtoffers op ba-
sis van de TAS en het zeven-gezichtspuntenarrest 
in  Van Hese/De Schelde en de toepassing daarvan 
in de lagere rechtspraak maken dat het arrest 
 Moor van het EHRM voor de Nederlandse rechts-
praktijk en Nederlandse asbestslachtoffers geen 
gevolgen heeft.” 
 7. Deze uitspraak is ook gepubliceerd in 
 EHRC 2014/240, m.nt. J.M. Emaus. 
 T. Barkhuysen en M.L. van Emmerik 
 AB 2015/38 
 HOF VAN JUSTITIE VAN DE EUROPESE UNIE 
 19 november 2014 , nr. C-404/13 
 (R. Silva de Lapuerta, K. Lenaerts, A. Arabadjiev, J.-
C. Bonichot, J.L. da Cruz Vilaça; A-G N. Jääskinen) 
 m.nt. Ch. Backes 
 Art. 13, 22, 23 Richtlijn 2008/50/EG (kaderricht-
lijn luchtkwaliteit); art. 4, 19 VEU 
 ECLI:EU:C:2014:2382 
 Luchtkwaliteitsplannen; Grenswaarden lucht-
kwaliteit betekenen resultaatsverplichting; 
verplichting derogatie aan te vragen; verplich-
ting rechter om bestuur te bevelen luchtkwali-
teitsplan op te stellen. 
 Artikel 13 lid 1 alinea 1 van richtlijn 2008/50 be-
paalt met betrekking tot zwaveldioxide, PM 
10
 , lood 
en koolmonoxide dat de lidstaten ervoor ‘zorgen’ 
dat de niveaus van de grenswaarden niet worden 
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